Introduction
Founded on 1 January 1995, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one of the most important and controversial of organisations in global economic policy. Although the familiar depictions of it as some all-powerful nemesis of the global public good are nothing more than populist hyperbole 3 , a number of serious objections to the rules and practices of the Organisation do exist. In particular, it is argued that the Organisation is institutionally dominated by its more powerful Member States, and that its apparent equal treatment of all members masks inherent bias in towards the industrialised world 4 .
Nowhere in the WTO regime is institutional independence from Member State interests more important than in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), the quasi-judicial system through which alleged violations of WTO agreements are adjudicated. Unprecedented steps were taken by the Parties to the Uruguay Round Agreements, establishing the Organisation, in attempting to create an international arbitration system free from the influence of diplomatic power relations, under which the force of legal argument alone could prevail. This study examines the results so far.
The central focus here is the posited capacity of states, as parties to formal dispute settlement proceedings, to influence the outcome of these proceedings other than by legal argument, and thereby to attack the trade policy measures of other states, or to defend their own. It assesses both the individual power of states in this regard, and the influence of third party states intervening in support of others. It is hoped that the outcome will make a novel contribution to the academic study of the DSM, and develop understanding of the system at the practical level, as well as informing the public debate about state sovereignty, international law and the concept of 'world government'.
The approach taken in this study adopts techniques from both legal and political science scholarship to explore the workings of the Organisation's legal machinery, and to undertake a sympathetic but sceptical analysis of political science criticisms of the DSM. This study is neither an attempt to prove nor disprove any claims made by critics of the WTO, but rather an Furthermore, in attempting a quantitative analysis of the history of WTO dispute settlement, this study examines the potential for a more comprehensive survey of DSM litigation than has yet been made. It is hoped that the results will illuminate the patterns of dispute outcomes in the past decade, and shed light on an area of international relations and public policy which is all too often misunderstood. Criticisms that the DSM is in some way biased in favour of rich countries, multinational corporations or other dominant actors are not common in serious legal-political literature, but some such arguments have been made. , focusing on the Appellate Body, claim that "in the short term … decision making will be strategic and often political" 13 , and provide qualitative evidence to support this. Steinberg (2004) Leitner & Lester (2005) 16 See, eg: Austin & Hummer (2000) , George & Epstein (1992) , Yates (1999) 17 Priest & Klein (1984) 18 Estimates include 77% for the GATT (Hudec 1993) , and 88% for the WTO (Iida 2003) ; this study calculates similar figures, using different techniques; see below 19 Iida (2003) 20 Hudec (1993) 21 Busch (2000) However 
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Methodology -The Research Model
The first step in constructing the model for this study was the selection of the appropriate unit of analysis. The study was conducted using the complete 22 , Steinberg (2004) (Charnovitz (2002) , Steinberg (2004) ); they may also have greater influence over Panel selection (Shoyer (2003) , Stewart & Burr (1998) ), or over reappointment of Appellate Body members, and have greater capacity to damage the credibility of DSM rulings by successfully defying sanctions (Steinberg (2004) p. 249) 32 The bargaining power of individual states may be closely linked to their economic strength in terms of trade volumes and economic size. Equally, the strength of a state's national economy will affect its capacity to weather the impact of retaliatory sanctions. There are also criticisms that the WTO system is inherently biased in favour of richer states, due to its institutional structure and system of rules (See eg: Raghavan (2000)) Initially, differentials in GDP, trade volume and market capitalisation of domestic companies were used as independent variables, as all could hypothetically have an impact on the decision making of Panels or the Appellate Body. It was then found in the initial stages of the regression analyses that these three variables exhibited extreme multicollinearity,
showing that their patterns of variance are too similar for conclusions drawn from them to be reliable. However, the model would not retain its conceptual completeness if these variables were removed. Therefore, an index variable was constructed to take account of the major economic differentials between parties. The four dichotomous variables used were based upon whether (1) In each dispute, three forms of coding were applied to the result. In the first, binary coding, results were coded as a "win" or "loss" for the Complainant, in three categories, as rulings favouring the Complainant or Respondent, and mixed rulings 37 ; or according to the eventual policy outcome of the dispute as a whole, with the formal ruling being only one element of this 38 . The coding scheme used here focuses in more detail on individual legal arguments than previous analyses, and provides a more sophisticated analysis of the formal result of DSM proceedings than has been carried out to date.
35 All dispute settlement reports are available on the WTO website, at www.wto.org 36 Iida (2003) 37 Reinhardt (2001) 13
The quantitative literature on judicial decision-making at the domestic level often makes use of logit (or probit) regression to analyse factors which influence decisions 39 , and these techniques were adopted here. An experimental logit regression was carried out using the binary coding of results outlined above; in order to provide further detail, the percentage result variable (the percentage of arguments won by the Complainant) is used as the output for an Ordinary Least Squares regression.
Incorporating Third Parties
The second level of analysis in this study examines the impact of third party "coalitions" 40 on DSM proceedings. This was assessed both as a new variable in itself, specifically the differential between the raw numbers of third parties supporting each participant, and also by weighting this figure to take into account the totals of the Power Index and previous use figures relevant to the states in coalitions.
In order to assess the impact of coalition building on dispute settlement proceedings, it was necessary to create a coding scheme for third party positions, and this was done on the basis of their submissions and answers to questions, as presented in published reports. arguments. In addition, the F and t significance statistics in each case are unacceptably high, at between 0.08 and 0.728. At values of more than 0.05, the hypotheses that these variables have no effect on the success of claims cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level, meaning that there is a greater than 5% chance that any relationships between these factors and the results can be considered random.
The two variables which provided positive results are Difference in Previous
Use and Difference in Third Party Numbers. The significance statistics for these variables are 0.006 and 0.007 respectively, meaning that the null hypotheses of no effect can be rejected at the 0.01 level. There seems, therefore, to be a relationship between these factors and the outcome of Panel proceedings.
In order to see the effects of thes ors on the outcome, controlling for each er, a further re n both ariables ether.
The results g re show e fact oth gressio was carried out using v tog of this re ression a n in Table 1 . The Tolerance and VIF statistics, of 0.873 and 1.145 respectively, show that the two variables do not covary to an extreme extent.
Percentage Win Code
Interpreting the standardised coefficients, we can see that for each unit increase in the Difference in Use (every previous dispute litigated by the Examining the standardised coefficients, we can see that both independent variables have a similar degree of impact on the result, but in opposing directions.
However, there remain some problems with these results. The R 2 statistics for these regressions are 0.055 and 0.053, meaning that less than 6% of the variation in the dependent variable can be explained by these factors. Also, as these bivariate regressions are very limited models, we cannot draw particularly strong conclusions from them, due to the very slight margins involved.
In conclusion, there seems to be a weak relationship between both previous experience and coalition size and the number of arguments won at the Panel stage of WTO proceedings.
Appellate Body Decisions: OLS Regression
For the same reasons as those affecting some of the Panel results discussed above, none of the results in the OLS regression of the Appellate Body data can be interpreted in depth. The F-test significance statistics for these regressions were all between 0.072 and 0.566, and therefore none of the null hypotheses can be rejected at the 0.05 level. In addition, the R 2 statistics are all less than 0.032, and in one case as low as 0.003, meaning that none of these variables explains more than 4% of the change in the number of arguments won by the Complainant before the Appellate Body.
Therefore we can say that, on this model, there does not seem to be any relationship between the independent variables used and the percentage balance of decisions of the WTO Appellate Body.
Panel and Appellate Body Decisions: Logit Regression
In order to analyse the effects of the given variables on the probability of a result being awarded to one party or the other, at a broad level, bivariate logit analyses were also carried out. Multivariate analysis was precluded by the multicollinearity among the independent variables described above. Among For the Appellate Body data, the only variable for which the p significance value is less than 0.05 is C=Quad (the Complainant being a 'Quad' country).
Interpreting the results shown in the table, we can see that, in the change from 0 to 1 in the independent variable, that is, if the Complainant is a Quad country, the logged odds of the Complainant achieving a verdict in its favour decreases by 1.232. Looking at the odds ratio of 0.292, this translates to a conclusion that, if the Complainant is a Quad country, the odds of winning are transformed using the following procedure:
0.292 -1 = -0.708; -0.708 x 100 = -70.8
Therefore, on the data in this study, the odds of winning a particular dispute before the Appellate Body are reduced by over 70% if the Complainant is a Quad country, as against a non-Quad country.
However, the limited conclusions which seem to be possible from the foregoing analysis must be fully interpreted.
Analysis
To summarise, three apparently significant correlations can be seen in the regression analyses. These are: (1) (1) Greater experience in dispute settlement is a question of practical capacity -where states have participated in a greater number of disputes, their trade ministries and personnel will have greater experience of the system, and hence greater skill at dealing with it, both personally or institutionally. It is interesting to note that this trend is absent in Appellate
Body results, suggesting that it has less impact there. This result, however, is subject to several qualifications, described below.
(2) The suggestion that a larger number of third party supporters reduces the chances of Complainant success at the Panel stage is a surprising one.
Hypothetically, one would expect the effect of large coalitions, if any, to be an increase in the percentage of arguments won, and this conclusion seems to go against all theoretical premises regarding the DSM.
This conclusion is undermined by the consideration that this variable is an extremely crude representation of the factor which it attempts to measure, in that only takes account of the raw number of third parties who have contributed submissions to proceedings in favour of one party or the other.
More importantly, the conclusion based upon it is not corroborated by the Difference in Total Index Scores variable, which sums the value of the index scores of each coalition of parties. This variable individually is therefore not especially useful for drawing conclusions, although it does suggest a possible avenue for further investigation. On the basis of these results, it may be suggested that model itself is poorly specified for this analysis, and that some variables may be removed or added in order to improve it. In anticipation of such criticism, it is submitted that the modelled variables are all required in the study, as all represent different aspects of the range of capacities which states possess to attempt to influence the outcome of WTO proceedings 42 . It is acknowledged however that much further study, incorporating the inclusion of a wider range of variables than used here, is necessary to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the factors affecting dispute settlement decisions.
Conclusions & Observations
See above
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The results of the regression analyses in this study suggest that only one of the extra-legal factors considered has a substantial effect on the decisions of WTO Panels or the Appellate Body. The presented evidence suggests that
Complainant states which have participated in a larger number of dispute settlement proceedings than their opponents are likely to enjoy a higher success rate in terms of their arguments presented to Panels, as a result of this difference.
In making any statement on the basis of this evidence, we must bear in mind the limitations of the model. The independent variables used in this study provide a broad survey of the dimensions of influence which states may have in the legalised diplomatic arena of the DSM. Unfortunately, it is not possible in a study of this limited scale to take account of all potential factors, or even to fully quantify all variables. For instance, the coding of third party submissions is based purely on the content of dispute settlement reports, using a rigid (and thereby repeatable) coding method. It takes no account of states which may support one party or the other, but fail to make submissions.
Within the institutional structure of the WTO, such states would certainly be able to make their feelings known on certain issues without fulfilling all of the formalities of the DSM, but the quantification of such aspects of influence would be a task well beyond the scope of this work.
It is more instructive to note the theories which are not supported, and are even undermined by this research. Bearing in mind that the regression analyses in this study constitute a quantitative survey of the entire history of decided WTO disputes, there is no reliable evidence to suggest that either body supports richer or more powerful states as against others, or that they defer to larger coalitions of states on any issue. At this level of abstraction, then, it seems possible to state that the organs of the DSM seem immune from such pressures, adding weight to the arguments of the Organisation's supporters.
As the late Robert Hudec notes in his own statistical analysis of GATT disputes, "quantitative studies must always be approached with caution, of course, because the data are never as neat and tidy as they appear" 43 .
Other, less rigorous observations are possible, which contribute to our understanding of the DSM. Nevertheless it is submitted that this study has been a success. It raises a number of possibilities for further research, including a more detailed analysis of the impact of DSM experience on trade personnel and their success in dispute settlement proceedings, and a fuller conceptualisation of the effects of coalitions in DSM litigation. It is hoped that it has presented useful guidance on potentially fruitful areas of future investigation, and has also made a useful contribution to WTO scholarship.
Finally, it is also suggested, on a practical level, that if third party submissions really have no impact whatsoever on the outcome of proceedings, states have no need to continue to make them. There are significant costs in taking part in litigation, and these costs weigh especially heavily on the states least able to afford them. Why take on such costs if there is no increased likelihood of a favourable outcome? Further research, with more complex models and data sets, would be required to confirm this conclusion, but this is to overlook the simplest explanation, and indeed to ignore the overall conclusion of this study:
that from the statistical survey presented, there is no evidence to support claims of bias in WTO dispute settlement.
52 See, eg: Kwakwa (2000) , Raghavan (2000) 
